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Abstract 
We investigate the partisan foundations of political legitimacy. We argue that the goals 
parties pursue shape their supporters’ views about the political system via the messages 
they communicate about the desirability of the political system. Combining public 
opinion survey data collected in 15 democracies with data on the goal orientations and 
policy positions of 116 political parties, we find that office-seeking parties take more 
positive positions toward the status quo of the political regime than policy-seeking 
parties. Moreover, our results confirm that these positions have consequences. 
Specifically, supporters of parties with more positive positions toward the system report 
systematically higher levels of support than supporters of parties that communicate more 
negative views. Taken together, these findings suggest that political parties play an active 
role in shaping citizens’ views of the political system and that office-seeking parties in 
particular mobilize consent among citizens in contemporary democracies. 
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 At least since the Weimar Republic’s descent into fascism, scholars have assumed 
that low levels of citizen support can pose serious problems for democracies (Lipset, 
1959; Powell, 1982, 1986).1 As a result, researchers have devoted considerable energy to 
understanding beliefs about the political system, producing extensive literatures on 
system support – also variously referred to as political trust, confidence, legitimacy 
beliefs, and consent. Based on Eastonian notions of the importance of system outputs, as 
well as ideas about procedural and outcome fairness in the production of those outputs, 
scholars have come to the conclusion that these attitudes are shaped by what political 
systems are and do – their institutions, processes, and performance – and how people 
come to form beliefs about these – that is, individuals’ experiences with, and their 
perceptions and beliefs about, the system. As a consequence, people are said to extend 
greater legitimacy to political systems that produce superior outcomes (economic, 
political, and the like), and that do so fairly in citizens’ eyes (Tyler, 1990). 
Fundamentally, such explanations of political consent are based on a bottom-up 
model of legitimacy rooted in a principal-agent conception of democracy, where citizens 
as principals evaluate the performance of state institutions and choose to bestow 
legitimacy on them or withhold it.  The literature on system support that has grown up 
around this conception is broad and deep, and it has focused mostly on whether various 
kinds of performance indicators – such as the economy or political outcomes – affect 
people’s views of the political system. Typically missing from such accounts of 
legitimacy, however, are explanations that involve a degree of agency on the part of 
political elites rather than citizens. This is a curious and critical omission, given the 
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importance that students of democratic stability have frequently assigned to the actions of 
political elites (e.g., Bunce, 2003; Geddes, 1999; Przeworski, 2005; Weingast, 1997).  
This paper seeks to bring elites back into the study of system support through the 
door of political parties. While citizens frequently take a dim view of partisan politics and 
how it affects the functioning of democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 1995), few 
political scientists would dispute that political parties continue to play a crucial role in 
organizing democratic politics. In fact, democracy may be indeed unworkable (Aldrich, 
1995), if not unthinkable, save in terms of parties (Schattschneider, 1942). In this study, 
we examine how the central actors in democratic politics – political parties – contribute 
to political legitimacy and the ways in which political parties and partisanship jointly 
shape people’s views about the political system. We argue that the goals parties pursue 
shape their supporters’ views via the messages they communicate about the desirability 
of the political system. Thus, parties signal to their supporters their position on the 
functioning of the political system, and partisans are motivated to adopt their party’s 
position on whether the political system is worth their support.  
These arguments have important normative implications for how we view the 
underpinnings of democratic legitimacy.  Instead of bubbling up from below through 
people’s sovereign evaluations of the political system’s functioning, our argument 
implies the active mobilization of partisan consent from above.  In this way, political 
parties and the state on which they depend for resources and which they help guide are 
actively capable of mobilizing biases (or to use a more neutral term, heterogeneity) in 
citizens’ views (Schattschneider, 1960; see also Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007).  In 
fact, some parties are motivated to express support for the existing order to promote their 
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own organizational success. This also implies that legitimacy is more partisan and more 
elite driven than is often portrayed in the literature. 
To test our arguments, we combine and analyze mass survey data alongside data 
on parties’ goal orientations and policy positions in broad set of established democracies. 
Our results show that parties whose primary goal is to win office take more positive 
positions with regard to the status quo of the political regime.  Moreover, we find that 
partisans of parties with more positive positions toward the system report higher levels of 
political support than those of parties that take more negative positions.  These findings 
suggest that political parties play an active role in shaping citizens’ views of the political 
system and office-seeking parties in particular foster regime support among sizable 
segments of democratic electorates by communicating more positive opinions about the 
political system to their partisans than policy-seeking parties doß.  
 
Explaining System Support 
Over the years, students of political trust and system support have documented 
significant variation – across countries and over time – in citizens’ views toward 
democratic governance (Fuchs and Klingemann,1995; Klingemann, 1999). Speaking 
broadly, they have sought to explain this variation by focusing on how system 
performance and political context matter for people’s opinions about the political system. 
For example, citizens in countries whose economies perform better also typically have 
more positive views about the political system (e.g, Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg, 1993). 
Furthermore, studies have found that political systems whose characteristics enhance 
procedural and outcome fairness, and that do a better job representing citizens’ views in 
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the policy process, engender more positive attitudes about government among citizens 
(Miller and Listhaug, 1999). Specifically, people support institutions that are fair, 
transparent in their policy-making, as well as open to competing views (Tyler, 1990; 
Levi, 1997; Dalton, 1999; Levi and Stokes, 2000). Further, individuals in systems with 
more durable and less corrupt governments and governments that respect people’s 
political rights are more supportive of the existing political arrangements (Harmel and 
Robertson, 1986; Mishler and Rose, 1997, 2001; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003). 
Taken together, these findings paint a rich picture of how political institutions and 
the consequences they produce affect people’s legitimacy beliefs. Their contribution to 
how we think about legitimacy is particularly notable for providing explanations for 
cross-national and cross-temporal differences in levels of system support. This focus on 
cross-national differences has created an empirical and theoretical imbalance in the 
literature on political support, however. At the empirical level, what remain 
underexplored (and virtually ignored) are the high levels of variation within countries 
among similarly situated citizens. While some of the relatively static demographic or 
socio-economic characteristics of individuals – age, education, income, class, and gender 
– are consistently correlated with political support, much of its within-country variation 
remains unexplained (see, for instance, Newton, 1999; Newton and Norris, 2000; Orren, 
1997). 
The focus on cross-national differences in macro-political contexts as 
explanations of public support has produced a theoretical imbalance as well. Existing 
literature takes either a very macro- (or system-) focused view of why legitimacy varies, 
or it searches for the causes of this variation in individual citizens themselves.  We argue 
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that missing from existing explanations is the connective tissue of political parties and 
partisanship – politics, so to speak. In particular, to date the literature on political 
legitimacy has paid limited attention to the role parties play in actively shaping citizens’ 
views of the political system. Findings from empirical studies that have considered 
parties indicate that the availability of opportunities to express discontent – for example, 
because of the existence of minor protest parties – can enhance system support (Miller 
and Listhaug, 1990).  Similarly, citizens in countries with moderate multi-party systems 
as well as those with more proportional electoral rules exhibit higher levels of confidence 
in the functioning of political institutions (Norris, 1999). 
Yet, as is the case with existing scholarship on legitimacy generally, these 
explanations focus squarely on differences across political systems rather than on 
variation within systems. Below, we argue that a more comprehensive explanation of the 
role that political parties play requires a systematic examination of differences in the 
party-voter connection within countries as well, and that partisan attachments constitute 
the crucial link between parties, voters, and legitimacy beliefs. 
 
The Missing Link: Parties and Partisans 
Our model of citizen attitudes toward the political system involves two important 
elements – political parties and their supporters – that are connected via partisanship. 
First, we argue that parties vary in the goals they pursue, and this leads them to take 
different positions about the desirability of existing political institutions.  Second, we 
argue that party identification is the channel that allows parties to effectively 
communicate their positions to partisan supporters. Because parties differ in their 
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positions regarding the efficacy and desirability of existing political institutions and 
arrangements, and communicate these to their supporters, we expect significant 
heterogeneity in partisans’ views of the political system within countries. 
 
Partisanship 
Since the behavioral revolution in political science, partisanship (or partisan 
attachment, partisan identification) has been a fundamental organizing concept for 
understanding political behavior. More specifically, it is a major factor in shaping 
people’s attitudes about politics and, subsequently, their behavior. Following The 
American Voter, party identification typically has been conceptualized as an individual’s 
enduring affective attachment to a political party that is the product of early socialization 
experiences (Campbell et al., 1960, 1966; Hess and Torney, 1967; Franklin and Jackson, 
1983; Franklin, 1984).2 As a kind of social identity, this conceptualization is rooted in 
reference group theory and reflects the idea that individuals often define aspects of the 
self in terms of secondary groups in society, including political parties (Campbell et 
al.,1960, Ch 6; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). 
Because partisanship is assumed to reflect a psychological attachment to a 
political party, the conceptualization of individuals as partisans does not require their 
official membership in a party or other behavioral outcomes, such as voting for a 
particular party, although these may all be highly correlated with one another (Miller and 
Shanks, 1996).  Critical for our purposes, however, is the idea that partisanship, once 
acquired, subsequently shapes how new political information is interpreted. It thus acts as 
  7 
a so-called “perceptual screen through which the individual tends to see what is favorable 
to his partisan orientation” (Campbell et al., 1960: 133). 
Given the central role political parties play in modern democracies, we expect 
partisans to be motivated to accept the political status quo, including the political regime 
(its institutions and processes). Compared to non-partisans, partisans should therefore 
express higher levels of support for the role of political parties in a democracy, the party 
system they constitute, and the political order in which they are embedded (Holmberg, 
2003; Miller and Listhaug, 1990). Put simply, partisans like parties, and they care enough 
about politics to maintain an expressed attachment to them and the political system in 
which they operate (cf. Paskeviciute, 2009). 
A number of scholars assume that this connection between partisanship and 
system support exists, and that it is of direct relevance to, and in fact an indicator of, the 
health of democratic political systems (Dalton, 1996, 1999; Holmberg, 2003; Torcal, 
Gunther, and Montero, 2002; Miller and Shanks, 1996; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie, 1976). 
In fact, because of the strong relationship between party identification and support for the 
political system, some worry that weakening partisan attachments might erode people’s 
faith in democratic politics. The oft-decried decline in partisan attachments across 
Western democracies, so the argument goes, could turn out to be contagious and herald a 
disengagement from politics amongst voters and a decline in support for party-based 
democracy more generally (Dalton, 1999: 66; see also Holmberg, 2003). Similarly, the 
lack of strong partisan attachments in newly democratic states is seen as providing only a 
weak foundation for system support and regime stability (Dalton and Weldon, 2007). 
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Party Goals and Partisan Support for the Political System 
Viewed from the traditional partisanship perspective, partisan attachments should 
lead to higher levels of political support generally, regardless of the specific party voters 
identify with. After all, even parties outside of the political mainstream signal some 
allegiance to the rules of the democratic game, due to the very fact that they organize 
themselves as parties and contest elections. However, we argue that such a view 
oversimplifies reality by overlooking the fact that partisanship can have a variety of 
effects on how people view the political system. Specifically, we posit that parties differ 
significantly in the positions they take with regard to the political system, and that 
partisans are motivated to adopt these positions as their own. Not all parties are equally 
fond of the political status quo, and their supporters’ views reflect this variation as a 
result. 
We theorize that this variation in parties’ positions regarding the desirability and 
efficacy of existing institutional arrangements and procedures stems from the kinds of 
goals they pursue – or what has come to be known as parties’ goal orientations. Parties 
typically pursue a mix of goals, most prominently among them the pursuit of legislative 
and government office as well as a set of policy goals. According to Strøm’s (1990) 
behavioral theory of competitive parties, party leaders often find themselves in a position 
of having to trade off one goal – say, office – for the other – say, policy. This does not 
assume that they inherently value one more than the other, but it does mean that parties 
often cannot maximize on both dimensions (Strøm, 1990; Müller and Strøm, 1999; 
Erikson and Romero, 1990; Adams, 2001).3 Depending on how party leaders resolve this 
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trade-off, parties can be categorized as pursuing primarily policy goals (policy-seeking 
parties), winning and maintaining office (office-seeking parties), or a mix of the two. 
We argue that these goal orientations affect parties’ positions on the existing 
political structure in the country. Because office- seeking parties are less encumbered by 
party activists’ policy preferences and are therefore freer to maximize (re-)election 
(Strøm, 1990), they also are more likely to be electorally competitive, actually get elected 
to office, and implement their preferred policies. In fact, because office-seeking parties 
are more likely to become parties in parliament and government, they are also more 
likely to write the rules of the game and be in charge of enforcing them than parties 
outside of government or parliament.  As a consequence, they are also more likely to 
benefit from the status quo of a political system. 
Because they are the parties most deeply embedded in the state structure and 
responsible for its design and administration, we expect office-seeking parties to take 
more positive positions toward the existing system than policy-seeking parties.4 Although 
Laver and Hunt’s (1992) expert survey of party goals does not identify any parties as 
purely office-seeking to the exclusion of all other goals, examples of parties that give 
high priority to office over policy include the Center Democrats and Social Democrats in 
Denmark, the Independence Party in Iceland, and the Liberals as well as the Progressive 
Conservatives in Canada. 
This should differ starkly from policy-seeking parties. According to Strøm’s 
schema, these parties are more dependent on party membership as a resource, less likely 
to compromise their views and, as a consequence, less likely to gain elective office or 
enter governments. In addition, the very fact that a party is driven primarily by policy 
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considerations rather than the desire to win office implies that holding the reins of the 
status quo political structure is less important to them (and their members) than achieving 
political change, including perhaps institutional changes that would make it easier for 
such parties to be successful. Good examples of policy seeking parties are the (now 
defunct) Vlaams Blok in Belgium5 and the Reformed Political Party in the Netherlands. 
This does not imply that only policy-seeking parties ever propose institutional changes or 
that office-seeking parties never do – a good example of the latter is Britain’s Labour 
Party and its push for devolution – but it does imply that there is a general and long-
standing tendency for office-seeking parties to be more supportive of the existing 
political system than parties that primarily pursue goals other than office. 
The expectation that office oriented parties seek to reinforce the political status 
quo and thus are more likely to stake out positive positions about the system than policy 
seeking parties is only the first part of our story, however. The important second part is 
our contention that parties’ positions about the state and existing institutions will be 
reflected among party identifiers. Specifically, because the functioning of the political 
system is complex and often arcane, and because voters are known to be cognitive 
misers, partisanship is the channel by which individuals are motivated to adopt the 
political orientations of a party.  As a result, the positions parties take about the political 
system signal to partisans how and how well the system works. In most basic terms, if a 
political party takes a more positive position toward the system, its supporters will also 
express more positive attitudes toward that system. Conversely, political parties that take 
negative positions about the political regime in their country are also more likely to 
produce more cynicism among their partisans. In this way, parties’ positions (and 
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messages) about the political system are the mechanism that links parties’ organizational 
goals and their partisans’ views of the desirability of the political regime.  
In short, we argue that partisanship plays a crucial role in linking political parties 
and citizens in shaping their legitimacy beliefs, and hypothesize two mechanisms by 
which party identification influences people’s attitudes towards the political system: 1) 
the traditional view, according to which partisanship should increase people’s support for 
the political system regardless of the opinions parties express about the status quo of the 
political system, and 2) the party persuasion view, according to which positive party 
positions about the system should contribute positively to the legitimacy beliefs of their 
partisans.6 
Our argument implies that parties’ positions are exogenous to their supporters’ 
views: that is, the causal arrow is expected to run from parties’ messages to partisans’ 
views, rather than the reverse. We cannot completely rule out that some individuals may 
develop a partisan attachment to parties whose positions on the political system they 
agree with. However, we believe that our argument can be justified on a number of 
grounds. First, our expectations about the role of partisanship as a mover of attitudes 
about the political system are plausible and consistent with considerable amounts of 
research into the role of partisanship in shaping political behavior. Among these, the 
Michigan-based conception of party identification as an “unmoved mover” supports this 
interpretation: most citizens develop partisan attachments early in life, and these 
attachments are strongly resistant to change (Campbell et al., 1960; Miller and Shanks, 
1996; see also Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, 2002). And while we acknowledge that 
the stability of party identification is sometimes less than perfect, we also wish to note 
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that partisanship is a robust mover of people’s opinions regardless of its stability at the 
individual level,7 and that research on panel data consistently reveal partisanship to be 
causally prior to attitudes.8 Taken together, existing studies suggest that we are on safe 
grounds in expecting that partisan attachment increases the odds that voters rely on the 
party positions as a guide for political orientations, and that strong partisanship augments 
the persuasive power parties have for their supporters (Jacoby, 1988; see also Zaller, 
1992). As a consequence, our model of party positions, partisanship, and legitimacy 
beliefs implies a set of variable effects of partisanship on support depending on, and set 
in motion by, parties’ positions on the legitimacy and desirability of the existing 
democratic regime. 
 
Data and Measures 
To test our hypotheses about the potential heterogeneity in partisans’ views of the 
political system within countries, we combined and analyzed data collected at the level of 
individuals and political parties. Specifically, we combine survey data collected as part of 
the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) project (Module 1, 1996-2000) to 
measure partisanship and system support at the level of citizens with data on political 
parties from Laver and Hunt’s (1992) expert surveys and the Comparative Manifestos 
Project (CMP) (Klingemann et al., 2006) to measure parties’ goal orientations and their 
positions about the political system. The relevant survey and party indicators were 
available for 116 political parties in a broad set of established democracies (Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Great Britain, and the United States).9 The key 
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individual level variables are partisanship and system support, while the key party-level 
variables are party goal orientations and parties’ positions about the political system. 
 
Voters 
System Support  
We use two measures from the CSES surveys to gauge citizen support for the 
political system – satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy (attitudes about 
system responsiveness). Widely used, both tap into citizen evaluations of the 
performance of the political system at the level of the political regime (cf. Norris, 1999). 
Satisfaction with democracy is an indicator of system support measured at a low level of 
generalization (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svenson, 1995: 330; Anderson and Guillory, 
1997). While not without critics, it is commonly acknowledged to measure support for 
regime performance (Klingemann, 1999), as it focuses on people’s responses to the actual 
process of democratic governance and their attitudes toward a country’s “constitutional 
reality” rather than democracy as an ideal (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svenson, 1995: 328; 
Anderson et al., 2005: 41; Linde and Ekman, 2003). The relevant survey measure asked 
citizens whether they are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. The variable ranges from 0 to 3, 
with higher values indicating a more satisfied response. 
Political efficacy refers to “the feeling that individual political action does have, 
or can have, an impact upon the political process … the feeling that political and social 
change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this 
change” (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller, 1954: 187). Research distinguishes between 
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internal and external efficacy and defines the former as an individual’s sense that he or 
she can personally affect the political process and the latter as beliefs about the 
responsiveness of the political system to the electorate (Lane, 1959; Balch, 1974; Miller 
and Listhaug, 1990; Anderson et al., 2005: 42). External efficacy is particularly useful for 
our purposes because it measures citizens’ perceptions of the system’s performance on a 
normatively desirable dimension (responsiveness to citizen demands). Two survey items 
of whether politicians know and care what ordinary people think were used to construct 
this variable.10 The resulting indicator ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values on this 
index indicating a greater sense of external efficacy (see appendix for details).11 
 
Party Identification 
Students of electoral politics have long debated the conceptualization and 
measurement of party identification (Campbell et al., 1960; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie, 
1976; Fiorina, 1981). In a comparative context, the focus of contention has been whether 
the construct is applicable in countries outside the U.S., and, if so, how it should be 
measured to obtain cross-nationally comparable indicators. Both experimental and cross-
national studies suggest that respondents should be given a clear opportunity to register a 
“non-identity” (Johnston, 1992; Blais et al., 2001; Sanders, Burton, and Kneeshaw, 
2002). Such a question is available in the CSES data. Specifically, survey respondents 
were asked: “Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular party?” Response 
categories were coded dichotomously, with 1 indicating a positive answer and 0 
otherwise (no or don’t know).12  This measure has been shown to be applicable not only 
in two-party systems, as in the U.S., but also in multi-party systems, and it has been 
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shown to be valid across countries with variable partisan traditions and political 
institutions (Holmberg, 1994, 2003; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie, 1976). 
 
Parties 
Goal Orientations 
Our measure of party goals is based on Laver and Hunt’s (1992) expert surveys 
and indicates the extent to which parties prioritize office over policy. Specifically, experts 
were asked to evaluate each party on a twenty-point scale using the following question: 
“Forced to make a choice, would party leaders give up policy objectives in order to get 
into government, or would they sacrifice a place in the government in order to maintain 
policy objectives?” The response categories range from 1 to 20, with higher values 
indicating a greater office-seeking party orientation.13 Using responses from multiple 
experts, Laver and Hunt calculated an average value for each party’s relative priorities 
(for details, see Laver and Hunt (1992); and the appendix).14 Table 1 reports the average 
scores on the office orientation measure by party family;15 it reveals that conservative and 
agrarian parties are the most office oriented parties with the average scores above 13, 
while green and communist parties are least likely to trade their policy goals for office 
(with the average scores of 7.157 and 7.662 respectively). 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Party Position toward the Political System 
To measure party positions toward the political system, we relied on the Comparative 
Manifestos Project (CMP) data collected immediately prior to the CSES survey.  Based 
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on content analysis of party platforms issued before elections by human coders, the CMP 
is the only cross-national data collection project that includes indicators of party views 
towards the political system. Our reading of the original documents that the CMP data are 
based on revealed that statements coded under the rubric of “constitutionalism” provide 
the most appropriate indicator of a party’s stance vis-à-vis the political system because 
they clearly reflect party positions about the fundamental rules of a political regime and 
maintaining its status quo.16 
There are two categories of statements: first, “Constitutionalism: positive”, which 
represents the extent to which a party supports specific aspects of the constitution, uses 
constitutionalism as an argument for policy, as well as generally approves of the 
constitutional way of doing things; and second, “Constitutionalism: negative”, which 
reflects just the opposite.  The statements in these categories commonly included 
proposals for institutional changes, such as creating a presidency with substantial powers 
(proposed by the Australian Labor Party in its 1996 manifesto), or resisting changes in 
the existing constitutional order on the basis that it is “the product of hundreds of years of 
knowledge, experience and history” (as the UK’s Conservative Party proclaimed in its 
1997 manifesto).17 
In reading the manifestos, we found that parties often express support for some 
aspects of the constitutional order while criticizing others. Thus, to capture overall party 
positions toward the country’s institutional structure, we created a combined 
constitutionalism index by subtracting the percentage of “Constitutionalism: negative” 
statements from the percentage of “Constitutionalism: positive” statements.18 The 
resulting variable ranges from -10.61 (Bloc Quebecois in Canada) to 6.69 (the Liberal 
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Party in Canada) in our sample, with higher values indicating a more positive party 
position toward the political system.19 Looking at party scores on the constitutionalism 
index by party family (shown in Table 2) reveals that ethnic parties express the most 
negative positions about the desirability of existing political institutions and arrangements 
while liberal parties take the most positive positions (the average scores are -.511 and 
.581 respectively; the overall mean for 116 parties in our sample is .141).  
(Table 2 about here) 
Recent efforts to assess various approaches to measuring party policy positions 
have questioned the extent to which the CMP data reflect party policy positions as 
opposed to the relative salience of those policies (e.g., Benoit and Laver, 2007; Lowe et 
al., 2011).20 Conflating salience with positions poses a problem for studies of party 
competition that often seek to assess the extent of a genuine policy change in party 
positions over time using party locations on various policy dimensions – particularly the 
left-right continuum – derived from the CMP data.21  
A closer look at the debate, however, reveals few grounds for concern for the 
purposes of our analysis. The CMP data is indeed grounded in the saliency theory 
(Robertson, 1976; Budge and Farlie, 1977; Budge et al., 2001). According to this theory, 
parties take up positions by emphasizing certain policy areas on which their positions are 
more credible while deemphasizing other policy areas. As a consequence, policy changes 
usually take place when parties de-emphasize previous priorities and take up new ones 
(Budge, 1994: 455). This perspective is designed to accommodate the fact that, while 
parties can take opposite positions on some issues, this is not possible with respect to 
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valence issues (Stokes, 1963), such as environmental protection or corruption to which no 
direct counter-position is feasible (Volkens, Bara, and Budge, 2009).  
The measures derived from the CMP data, however, have rarely been interpreted 
as indicators of policy saliency for political parties. Specifically, Lowe and his colleagues 
(2011) argue that, according to the saliency theory, parties should endorse only single 
sides of each issue, while the CMP’s coding scheme makes numerous practical 
concessions to the fact that many issues are two-sided, such as positions on free trade, or 
on attitudes towards European integration.22  What is more, Benoit, Laver, and 
Mikhaylov (2009: 500) note that all CMP coding categories (except one, a seldom used 
category of economic goals) are explicitly positional in their definitions, as they refer to 
“favorable mentions of … “ , “need for…’, etc., and have been treated as indicators of 
policy positions rather than saliency by most researchers. In light of this discussion and 
the fact that our measures – “constitutionalism: positive” and “constitutionalism: 
negative” – are also based on the bi-polar coding scheme of the CMP data, we believe it 
is safe to interpret them as indicators of party positions towards the political system rather 
than saliency.  
 
Analysis 
 Do office-seeking parties express more positive opinions about the political 
system than policy-seeking parties? And do partisans of parties that communicate 
positive views about the constitutional status quo express more support for the political 
system in their country than citizens who identify with parties with negative views? 
Figures 1 and 2 offer some preliminary evidence at the aggregate level of the connections 
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between party goals, party positions about the political system, and citizens’ legitimacy 
beliefs.  
To examine whether parties’ goal orientations are related to their positions on the 
desirability of the political system, we calculated the average score on the 
constitutionalism index for parties with different goal orientations (Figure 1).23 Our 
calculations show that, on average, political parties with a preference of office over 
policy take more positive positions regarding the constitutional status quo than other 
parties.  In contrast, policy-seeking parties on average are more likely to take a negative 
position, with parties that balance between policy and office expressing a mild 
endorsement of the existing political order. The scores on the constitutionalism index for 
office- and policy-seeking parties are +.414 and -.606 respectively, while parties that 
balance between policy and office take a more neutral position on the political system 
(+.146). 
To examine whether party statements about the political system are linked to 
citizens’ legitimacy beliefs, we compared democracy satisfaction and external efficacy 
between nonpartisans and partisans of parties with high, low, and medium levels of 
support for the constitutional status quo (Figure 2).24 The data reveal patterns strongly 
consistent with our theoretical priors. Citizens’ attitudes toward the functioning of the 
political system vary according to party views about the existing political order. Figure 2 
shows that about 88 percent of respondents who feel close to parties with high scores on 
the constitutionalism index are fairly or very satisfied with the democratic process in their 
country, while only 58 percent of partisans of parties with low scores and 75 percent of 
identifiers with parties with medium scores express such views. In comparison, 72 
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percent of non-partisans report being satisfied with democracy, which places them above 
partisans of parties with low support for the constitutional status quo, but below partisans 
of parties with medium and high support for the political system.  
A similar pattern emerges when we look at external efficacy, with partisans of 
parties with high constitutionalism scores expressing the most positive attitudes about the 
responsiveness of the political system: 71 percent of these partisans scored high on the 
external efficacy scale, while the numbers for partisans with medium and low 
constitutionalism values were 63 and 55 percent, respectively. In comparison, non-
partisans report the lowest levels of external efficacy with 53 percent agreeing that the 
political system is responsive. Taken together, citizens who identify with parties that 
adopt positive views about the constitutional status quo express significantly more 
optimistic attitudes about the functioning of the political system than partisans of other 
parties and non-partisans. And while a lack of partisanship clearly undermines external 
efficacy beliefs, the pattern is less clear cut with respect to satisfaction with democracy, 
where partisans of parties with negative positions express even more negative views than 
non-partisans.  
 (Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
To establish how sizable and robust these relationships are once other factors are 
controlled for, we sought to estimate multivariate models of support for the political 
system. As discussed above, existing research provides strong reasons to expect the 
causal arrow to run from parties’ messages to partisans’ views, rather than reverse. 
However, in devising a proper estimation strategy, we sought to account for possible 
endogeneity by employing a two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach (Baum, 2006; 
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for application in political science, see Gabel and Scheve, 2007). Instrumental variable 
estimation purges the potentially endogenous regressor – in our case party positions 
towards the constitutional status quo – of variation that is not a function of exogenous 
variables.25 IV estimation is not a costless solution, however: IV estimates are less 
efficient compared to OLS and can be biased if the assumptions of the model are 
violated. We therefore needed to identify instruments that are valid, that is, have a 
significant partial correlation with party positions towards the constitutional status quo, 
controlling for all other exogenous determinants of citizens’ support for the political 
system, while being uncorrelated with the error term in the model of citizens’ support for 
the political system.  
We posit that party goal orientation and party seat-vote disproportionality can be 
used as such instruments. As we argued above, office-seeking parties adopt more positive 
positions towards the existing political system than policy-seeking parties. Office-seeking 
parties are less encumbered by party activists’ policy preferences, are freer to maximize 
(re-)election (Strøm, 1990), and therefore are more likely to be electorally competitive, 
get elected to office, and implement their preferred policies. Moreover, because office-
seeking parties are more likely to become parties in parliament and government, they are 
also more likely to write the rules of the game and be in charge of enforcing them than 
parties outside of government or parliament. As a consequence, they are also more likely 
to benefit from the status quo of a political system, and hence express more positive 
views about it than policy-seeking parties.  
Parties with a larger share of legislative seats than their share of votes can be 
similarly expected to express stronger support for the political system than parties that 
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received a smaller percentage of seats in comparison to their votes in national elections. 
Translation of votes into seats has been shown to play an important role in shaping party 
strategies and behavior, including party efforts to push for constitutional changes, 
especially in electoral systems (Colomer, 2005; Benoit, 2004, 2007). And while 
institutional changes and vote-seat dis-proportionality have traditionally been studied at 
the level of countries rather than parties, the underlying assumption of agent-based 
models of institutional change is that parties adopt different positions towards the status 
quo of the political system, in large part driven by party perceptions of how much they 
are advantaged or disadvantaged by existing political institutions.  
While office orientation and party seat-vote dis-proportionality matters for how 
parties evaluate the political system, we know of no studies arguing that these factors 
directly influence citizens’ legitimacy beliefs. Thus, we have theoretical and empirical 
reasons to justify the selection of our instruments; however, we still need to demonstrate 
that our instruments meet the assumptions for the IV approach to provide consistent 
estimates. The assumption that the instruments are statistically independent from the 
disturbance process cannot be verified in the data directly (Baum, 2006: 191). However, 
since our model is over-identified we can provide evidence that instruments are adequate 
by reporting test statistics below.26 
We report the results of two-stage IV estimations in Table 3 and Table 4. The first 
stage is designed to predict party positions towards the constitutional status quo using our 
instruments – party office orientation and party vote-seat disproportionality (measured by 
subtracting the percentage of party votes from the percentage of party seats in previous 
national election) – while controlling for all variables specified in the model of citizen 
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support for the political system and country fixed effects, and estimating our models 
using robust standard errors (see Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009).27 The second stage 
employs instrumented party position towards the constitutional status quo as an 
independent variable in the model of citizen support for the political system, controlling 
for other determinants of people’s attitudes towards their political system, including 
country fixed effects and using robust standard errors (see the appendix for detailed 
information on variable coding).  
The first stage of the IV estimations, reported in Table 3, indicates that both 
instruments have the anticipated signs and are significantly correlated with party support 
for the constitutional status quo. We find that, controlling for all predictors of citizen 
support for the political system as well as country dummy variables, political parties with 
office orientation report more support for the political system in their manifestos than 
policy-seeking parties. Similarly, parties that enjoy higher share of legislative seats than 
the proportion of votes they received in previous national election express more positive 
views about the constitutional status quo than parties who received fewer seats than they 
deserve given their vote share.  
To systematically asses the validity of our instruments, we rely on several test 
statistics. First, the F-statistic for test of excluded instruments is equal to 384 and the F-
statistic is significant at less than .001, indicating that our instruments are jointly 
significant. Furthermore, the Hansen J-test statistic in all models reported in Table 4 is 
statistically insignificant, indicating that the instruments are appropriately uncorrelated 
with the error term in the second-stage estimations. Taken together, the results show that 
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the selected instruments are relevant and statistically independent from the disturbance 
process, satisfying the key requirements of valid instruments of the IV approach.  
(Table 3 and 4 about here) 
Table 4 presents the results of the second stage estimations that employ the 
exogenously derived measure of party position toward the political system to explain 
citizens’ views about the political system. We provide two sets of results: first, we report 
the findings for all respondents. We do so to test two mechanisms by which partisanship 
can be expected to influence citizens’ attitudes towards the political system: 1) the 
traditional view, according to which partisanship should increase people’s support for the 
political system regardless of the opinions parties express about the constitutional status 
quo,28 and 2) party persuasion view, according to which party positions should influence 
their partisans’ legitimacy beliefs. To put the latter expectation to a more rigorous test, 
we then estimate our model using the sample of partisans only.  
In the second-stage estimations, we control for whether respondent’s preferred 
party is in government because winners have been shown to be more satisfied with 
democracy in their country than other voters (Anderson et al., 2005; Anderson and 
Guillory, 1997; Ginsberg and Weissberg, 1978; Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Norris, 1999). 
We also include respondent’s left-right self-placement because right-wing ideology is 
usually associated with conservatism and stronger support for the existing status quo, 
while left-wing orientations – with openness to change and more critical attitudes towards 
the political system (Anderson and Singer, 2008). Furthermore, since radical views 
usually lead to more dissatisfaction with a political system and a willingness to mobilize 
for change (Riker, 1982; Anderson et al., 2005, ch.5), we include a measure capturing 
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individual’s distance from the country’s median on the left-right continuum. In addition, 
we sought to identify citizens with a greater stake in the maintenance of the societal 
status quo using variables such as income, education, and unemployment, as well as 
gender and race, which reflect citizens’ socioeconomic status or political resources 
(Almond and Verba, 1963; Anderson et al., 2005: 20) At the party level, we additionally 
control for party distance from the country’s median on the left right-continuum and 
party share of legislative seats, and include country fixed effects to capture cross-country 
heterogeneity in public support for the political system (see appendix for survey question 
wording and variable coding for all measures). 
The results of the second stage estimations are in line with our expectations.29 We 
find that partisans’ beliefs about the performance of the political system are consistent 
with their parties’ support for the constitutional status quo. That is, partisans whose 
parties take more positive positions toward the political system express higher levels of 
satisfaction with the way democracy works and report higher levels of confidence that the 
political system is responsive to them. These findings hold when we estimate our model 
using all respondents (partisans and non-partisans), as well as when we run our analyses 
on a reduced sample of partisans only. Hence, we find that parties play an important role 
in shaping their partisan views about the political system. At the same time, the results 
for all respondents show that partisanship exerts a direct positive effect on citizens’ 
external efficacy, regardless of party outlook toward the political regime. Thus, 
individuals who are attached to parties are more likely to believe that the system is 
responsive to their preferences and demands than non-partisans.30  
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The other control variables produce results consistent with prior research. We find 
that supporting the government and having positive evaluations of economic performance 
increase citizen satisfaction with democracy and their sense of external efficacy. What is 
more, the results show that higher income and education contribute positively to public 
support for the political system, as does being young and male. Moreover, right-wing 
ideological self-placement is linked to stronger legitimacy beliefs. However, ideological 
extremity has divergent effects on our two dependent variables: while it tends to reduce 
citizen satisfaction with democracy, it enhances people’s sense of external efficacy.  
How much does party support for political system matter in shaping their partisan 
legitimacy beliefs? To assess our results in greater detail, we calculated the marginal 
effects of party position toward the constitutional status quo on partisans’ legitimacy 
beliefs using the results for partisans reported in Table 4.31 Figure 3a plots the magnitude 
of this effect for the satisfaction with democracy variable, and Figure 3b – for external 
efficacy. The dark-grey bars indicate the levels of system support among partisans whose 
parties express positive views about the system (1 standard deviation above the average 
constitutionalism score in our sample of parties), while white bars report the levels of 
system support among identifiers of parties with negative views (1 standard deviation 
below the average constitutionalism value); the vertical bars show the 95% confidence 
intervals. 
Calculations of the substantive effects reveal that party positions toward the 
political system have a sizable impact on their partisans’ legitimacy beliefs. Specifically, 
satisfaction with democracy among partisans of parties that express positive views is .43 
units higher than levels of satisfaction among those who identify with parties that take 
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negative positions (2.432 vs. 2.003). Similarly, the predicted level of external efficacy 
among supporters of parties positively oriented toward the system is 5.196 compared to 
4.438 for partisans of parties with negative views (a difference of .758). In short, what 
parties say about the political system in their country has a powerful impact on their 
partisans’ legitimacy beliefs, and this effect is consistent and statistical significant across 
different measures of legitimacy beliefs.32 
(Figures 3a and 3b about here) 
Discussion 
Modern democracies are party democracies. Yet, political parties have yet to take 
center stage when it comes to how citizens evaluate the political system. This study was 
designed to show that political parties play an important role in shaping citizens’ views 
about the system. As organizations, political parties pursue a variety of goals; while some 
put greater emphasis on winning office, others are willing to forego office in the pursuit 
of policy objectives.  And these organizational goals, we argue, affect what supporters 
think about the political system because office-oriented parties have an incentive to take 
more positive positions about the political regime, while policy-seeking parties take a 
more critical stance. 
Partisanship provides the critical link between party elites and party supporters in 
communicating views about the political system. By communicating their positions, 
office- and policy-seeking parties engender different levels of enthusiasm for the status 
quo among their supporters. As a result, political parties actively shape the beliefs 
citizens adopt about the functioning of democratic governance in their country. Using 
survey data collected in 15 countries and data on parties’ goals and positions for 116 
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parties, we find that party positions do influence public support for the political regime 
and that this effect is not an artifact produced by strategic position taking by parties. 
We find that supporters of political parties with more positive views about the 
political system tend to be more satisfied with democracy and report higher levels of 
external efficacy than partisans of parties with pessimistic opinions. Moreover, we find 
that non-partisans are more satisfied with democracy than citizens who identify with 
parties with a negative outlook towards the political system but less satisfied than 
partisans of parties with positive positions. However, a lack of partisanship has an 
overwhelming negative effect on citizens’ external efficacy beliefs, as non-partisans are 
considerably more pessimistic about the responsiveness of the political system than 
partisans of any party. Finally, we find that party positions toward the system are driven 
by the goals they pursue when faced with a trade-off between office and policy. Office-
seeking parties express more support for the status quo of the existing regime and thus 
lead to more satisfaction with the system among their supporters compared to policy-
oriented parties. 
By integrating research on party goals, party programs, partisanship, and 
democratic legitimacy, we sought to make a contribution to each of these literatures. 
Regarding the literature on democratic legitimacy, our findings suggest that parties 
clearly have the capacity to mobilize consent or dissent from above.  Thus, legitimacy is 
as much a process of bottom-up politics where citizens hold the political system 
accountable for its performance, as it is a process of top-down politics where strategic 
elites seek to further their own goals, sometimes at the expense of the broader body 
politic.  We need not resort to extreme examples like the failure of the Weimar Republic 
  29 
to appreciate this point – examples of party elites shaping the views of their supporters 
abound in a variety of policy areas (e.g., Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2007; Gabel and 
Scheve, 2007). Whether this mobilization of consent, born of the parties’ self-interested 
strategic calculations as office seekers and status quo defenders, is desirable is a 
normative question that hitherto has not been asked.  We suggest that, at a minimum, it is 
worth thinking about. 
Our study also contributes to the literature that seeks to explain the causes and 
consequences of parties’ policy positions.  While these have mostly been studied from a 
cross-national perspective with an eye toward the quality of democratic representation 
(Kim, Powell, and Fording, 2010; McDonald and Budge, 2005), or how the translation of 
voters’ preferences into government policy shapes citizen support for the political system 
(Paskeviciute, 2006), our study suggests that parties’ positions on the functioning of the 
political system can also be fruitfully understood to shape the foundations of citizens’ 
legitimacy beliefs. 
In a curious way, then, our findings reinforce Dalton’s concerns that a loosening 
of the connection between political parties and citizens observed in established 
democracies may indeed undermine mass support for the democratic governance. And 
this is likely to happen not only because the lack of partisanship will weaken citizen 
attachment to a political system generally.  Given that political elites are usually more 
supportive of democratic principles than are ordinary citizens (Sullivan et al., 1993; 
Converse and Pierce, 1986), support for the political system may be eroding because 
citizens are less likely to be affected by the positive messages office-seeking parties 
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articulate about the system. Thus, in times of de-aligned citizens, legitimacy from above 
is harder to come by.  Whether this is such a terrible state of affairs remains to be seen. 
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Notes
 
1 See also Norris (1999), Pharr and Putnam (2000), and Dalton (2004). 
2 In the rational choice perspective, such an attachment is more of a cognitive short cut 
representing a running tally of retrospective assessments of party performance (Fiorina, 1981). 
3 To say that politicians act as entrepreneurs and are motivated by the desire to get into office and 
convert office-benefits into private goods (Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Strøm, 1990; 
Müller and Strøm 1999) is not to say that policy is unimportant to them (Hunt and Laver, 1992).  
After all, only policy-oriented individuals are likely to become party leaders in the first place 
(Laver, 1997: 84-85). However, the extent to which party leaders are capable of pursuing office 
when faced with a trade-off between policy and office is determined by a number of factors, 
including a party’s organizational structure as well as electoral, legislative, and governmental 
institutions (Strøm, 1990; Müller and Strøm, 1999). 
4 This argument about the positive positions about the state and its structure that office-seeking 
parties are likely to take is also consistent with scholarship on the changing character of party 
organization.  In particular, it dovetails with the conceptual development and identification of so-
called “cartel parties” (Katz and Mair, 1995). In contrast to traditional “catch all” parties that 
emerged in the 1950s and 1960s and that were based primarily on mass membership, or cadre 
parties that relied on a small band of committed party members (Kirchheimer, 1966), the primary 
characteristic of the modern cartel party is its intimate relationship with the state. In Katz and 
Mair’s classification scheme, cartel parties have in fact become “agents of the state” (Wolinetz, 
2002: 148). While the idea of cartel parties is not uncontested (see, e.g., Koole, 1996), scholars 
have come to see the concept of cartel parties and the classification of parties according to their 
goal orientations as theoretically compatible and complementary.  In particular, because the 
success and survival of cartel parties require access to predictable sources of revenue from the 
state and privileged access to (often publicly owned or financed) mass media (including 
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television), office-seeking parties collude in sharing the resources for their collective survival, 
which at the same time in a cartel-like manner bars newcomers from entering the system. Thus, 
Wolinetz (2002) recently proposed a simple way to integrate parties’ goal orientations and 
theories of party organizational change by arguing that office-seeking parties also are typically 
cartel parties. 
5 The Vlaams Blok was dissolved after a Belgian court convicted it of repeated incitement to 
discrimination in 2004. It reconstituted itself as Vlaams Belang shortly thereafter. 
6 Please note that we hypothesize party persuasion effects only among partisans, not all voters. 
This is because our study is designed to test the consequences of partisanship for people’s 
attitudes towards the political system, and, as we argue above, one of the mechanisms by which 
partisanship does so is by enabling party persuasion of their partisans.    
7 For useful literature overviews, see Johnston (2006) and Holmberg (2007).  
8 Studies of public opinion based on panel data show that partisanship causally precedes people’s 
attitudes and values. For example, analyses of the interdependence of respondents’ issue positions 
(on social welfare, race, and culture) and partisanship show that party attachment influences 
people’s issue positions much more strongly than issue positions influence partisanship (Layman 
and Carsey, 2002; Carsey and Layman, 2006). As well, consistent with the limited evidence that 
exists about the link between legitimacy beliefs and partisanship (Koch, 2003), Goren’s (2005) 
structural equation model of three-wave panel data reveal that partisanship affects people’s 
political values more strongly than the reverse. Similarly, recent reevaluation of the priming 
effects (Lenz 2009) showed that electoral campaign and media attention often leads individuals to 
learn party issue positions and then to adopt the position of their preferred party as their own (but 
see Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu 2011). 
9 Our party and survey data are drawn from different time periods, and their causal ordering is as 
our theory implies. Specifically, the Comparative Manifestos Project data are very close, yet 
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always temporally prior to, the CSES data. This is because all manifestos are pre-election 
documents and CSES surveys in our data are post-election surveys, and the interviews were 
usually carried out shortly after the elections. Our measures of party goals from the Laver and 
Hunt (1992) expert surveys were collected between 1989 and 1992. Although this is at least four 
years earlier than the CSES data, the temporal distance should not be a problem given that expert 
surveys such as the Laver and Hunt survey are excellent measures of long-term general 
tendencies in party goals that reflect longstanding organizational strategies and constraints rather 
than tactical behavior at any point in time. 
10 The Cronbach’s alpha for these two items is .62, indicating that they could be combined into a 
single index.  
11 The CSES data include two additional items that could be considered as indicators of external 
efficacy: 1) who people vote for makes a difference, and 2) who is in power can make a 
difference. Unfortunately, the Cronbach’s alpha of adding one or both of these items to the 
indicators we already use for our external efficacy measure (or combining these two items 
together into a separate index) fails to achieve the necessary level of .6, suggesting that we should 
not add these items into a single index. However, estimating our models for each external 
efficacy item separately produces consistent and statistically significant results that in line with 
our expectations in three out of four cases (the positive coefficient fails to achieve the 
conventional levels of statistical significance only for “who is in power can make a difference” 
(the results are available from authors upon request).  
12 An alternative would be constructing a four-category measure of party identification suggested 
by Holmberg (2003) that not only accounts for the presence or absence of partisanship but also 
for its intensity. However, survey items necessary for creating such more finely-grained measure 
were not available for Australia, Belgium, Canada, and New Zealand. We therefore opted to rely 
on a dichotomous indicator of party identification in the models reported below. To test the 
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robustness of our results, we also estimated our models using full partisanship scale for the 
countries where such measure is available (the results available from the authors upon request). 
The results were in line with our expectations. Moreover, they revealed that the impact of party 
messages about the desirability of the political regime was particularly powerful among strong 
party identifiers in shaping their legitimacy beliefs, suggesting that party persuasion increases 
with partisanship intensity.  
13 Thus, it does not assume that policy-seeking parties do not care about office; only that, when 
faced with a trade-off, they are more likely to give a preference to policy rather than office. 
14 Very small parties not listed in the CMP data were not included in the analysis (for more 
information, see our description of the CMP data and measures below). We therefore also 
examined the robustness of our results to the inclusion of these parties by coding them as neutral 
(10) – that is, they were assumed to be balancing between office and policy motivations.  When 
we do so, our results do not change appreciably, and our inferences remain the same. 
15 We relied on the CMP codes to classify parties into different party families with one additional 
modification. Since the CMP data does not have a separate category for extreme right parties, we 
identified these parties following Golder (2003) and Norris (2005), and recoded party family 
measures so that they can accommodate this additional category.  
16 The CMP data are particularly useful to test our conjecture because they are manifestoes 
designed to win voter support.  As such, they are clearly aimed at voters, but may also reflect the 
different campaign strategies of office-seeking and policy-seeking parties.  While we cannot test 
this possibility here, it is plausible that parties with different goal orientations may seek to change 
the nature of the debate in elections, with office-seeking parties seeking to frame the election as a 
debate over issues and candidates and policy-seeking parties interested in making it a debate over 
the political system and how well it works to represent voters. 
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17 We are grateful to Andrea Volkens and Paul Pennings for making the original coded party 
manifestos available to us.  
18 The CMP indicators represent percentages of party statements within party platforms designed 
to address each of the 56 issues within the CMP classification scheme. This means that the 
possible range on each measure is from 0% (when a party does not mention the issue at all) to a 
maximum theoretical value of 100% (when all statements within a manifesto focus on the issue) 
19 One shortcoming of the CMP data is that they provide measures only for parties that won two 
or more seats in parliament, ignoring smaller parties. To keep at least some smaller parties in our 
analyses, we made the following decisions: we excluded small parties that never appeared in the 
CMP data from beginning of its coverage in 1950 until the CSES survey. However, we kept 
parties that failed to appear in the CMP data in the election just before the CSES survey but were 
included in the CMP data in previous elections. There were 10 such parties, increasing our 
sample of parties from 106 to 116. We assigned these small parties a value of 0 on the 
constitutionalism index, which assumes that they take a neutral position towards the political 
system. Since parties without legislative representation are more likely to be dissatisfied with the 
political system and its institutions than parties in parliament (please note that our analyses 
control for party legislative size), coding them this way offers a conservative test of our 
hypotheses – that is, it makes it harder to uncover the expected effects on partisan attitudes 
toward the political system. Excluding all small parties from the analyses, however, does not 
change our results appreciably, and our inferences remain the same (the results are available from 
the authors upon request).  
20 See also the special issue in Electoral Studies (2007), vol. 6, issue 1. 
21 This problem is further magnified by the absence of measurement error of the CMP indicators 
– a consequence of each party manifesto being coded by one expert coder (Benoit, Laver, and 
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Mikhaylov, 2009; Benoit and Laver, 2007; but see Volkens, 2007; Volkens, Bara, and Budge, 
2009). 
22 Lowe et al. (2011) point out that even environmental protection (considered as one-sided issue 
in the CMP data) could be easily paired with pro-growth positions, and this is in fact how other 
approaches to measuring party policy positions have expressed the environmental policy 
dimension (Benoit and Laver, 2006; Laver and Hunt, 1992).  
23 For the purpose of this figure, we defined policy-seeking parties as parties that scored equal to 
or below 7 on the 1-20 office-seeking scale and office-seeking parties as those with a score above 
13 on the scale; balancing parties score between 7 and 12 on the scale.  
24 High support for the constitutionalism status quo is defined as party positions with values 1 
standard deviation or more above the mean of the constitutionalism index, low support –1 
standard deviation or more below the mean, and medium – values than fall between +/-1 standard 
deviation from the mean.  
25 IV estimates also eliminate bias due to omitted variables and measurement error (Baum 2006; 
Gabel and Scheve, 2007).  
26 For a similar approach, see Gabel and Scheve (2007).  
27 Note that due to the inclusion of country fixed effects, identification in this model comes from 
within country variation in party characteristics.  
28 According to our model, non-partisans do not have a ‘party position’, but we assigned them a 
value of zero on the constitutionalism index so that we could keep them in the analyses because 
testing the traditional perspective requires that we include both partisans and non-partisans.  
29 Recall that the measure of party position towards the constitutional status quo was incorporated 
in the individual level data by assigning partisan respondents the value of their party positions. 
Technically, this means that this variable is an interaction term of partisanship and (instrumented) 
party position.  
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30 To test the robustness of our results, we conducted several additional analyses: we re-estimated 
our models 1) without extreme right and communist parties; 2) without small parties (see endnote 
19 above); 3) using a disaggregated external efficacy index - that is, estimating our models for 
each external efficacy item in the CSES data (see endnote 11); 4) using the full party 
identification measure for a reduced number of countries where this measure is available to see 
whether party persuasion effects strengthen with partisanship intensity (see endnote 12); 5) using 
multi-level statistical techniques in the second stage of our analyses instead of the IV estimations; 
6) using exactly identified equation with party office orientation as a single instrument; 7) to test 
that party positions about the political system influence citizens’ satisfaction with democracy and 
external efficacy but not internal efficacy, such as citizens’ beliefs about whether people in their 
country express or hide what they think about politics; 8) using an interaction term between party 
positions and the number of days since election to test whether the impact of party positions is 
weakened by temporal distance of the CSES survey date from election. In all cases, our findings 
were in line with our expectations and our inferences remained the same (the results are available 
from the authors upon request). 
31  We hold other variables at their means and dichotomous variables at their medians; all country 
dummies, except Denmark, are set to zero.  
32 To test the robustness of our results, we disaggregated our external efficacy index and 
estimated our models for each external efficacy item. The results (available from the authors upon 
request) do not change and our inferences remain the same.  
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Table 1. Party Office Orientation by Party Family. 
 
Party family  N Mean  SD Min Max 
Green  6 7.157 2.279 4.75 10 
Communist 12 7.662 2.869 2 11 
Extreme Right  8 9.059 3.791 1 14 
Ethnic  19 9.477 1.921 5.5 13 
National  1 10 - 10 10 
Liberal  14 12.154 2.989 6.33 16.68 
Christian Democrat 10 12.393 2.208 7.91 14.77 
Social Democrat 26 12.768 2.418 7.5 16.83 
Conservative  16 13.569 2.177 9.86 16.59 
Agrarian  4 13.645 2.603 10.47 16.11 
Total  116 11.165 3.268 1 16.83 
 
 
Table 2. Party Position towards the Constitutional Status Quo by Party Family.  
 
Party family  N Mean SD Min Max 
Ethnic  19 -0.511 2.538 -10.606 2.768 
National  1 0 - 0 0 
Agrarian  4 0 0 0 0 
Christian Democrat 10 0.099 0.312 0 0.987 
Social Democrat 26 0.136 0.41 -0.57 1.153 
Green  6 0.178 0.373 0 0.937 
Communist 12 0.194 0.381 -0.207 0.971 
Extreme Right  8 0.215 0.502 0 1.431 
Conservative  16 0.518 0.953 -0.507 3.229 
Liberal  14 0.581 1.771 -0.201 6.69 
Total  116 0.141 1.295 -10.606 6.69 
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Table 3. Predicting Party Support for Constitutional Status Quo in 15 Democracies. 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
Party	Position	towards	the	
Constitutional	Status	Quo	
Party office orientation .221*** 
(.017) 
Party seat-vote disproportionality .048*** 
(.003) 
Included exogenous individual-level regressors Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes 
Number of parties 116 
Partial R-squared for excluded instruments .139 
F-statistic for test of excluded instruments 384.35 
F p-value .000 
Note: The results are 2SLS first-stage coefficient estimates (using Stata’s ivreg2  
command) and their robust standard errors (in parentheses): *p<.05, **p<.01,  
***p<.001. 
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Table 4. Predicting Citizen Support for Political System in 15 Democracies, 1996-2002.  
 
	
	
Independent	
variables		
All	Respondents	 Partisans	Only	
Democracy 
Satisfaction 
External 
Efficacy 
Democracy 
Satisfaction 
External 
Efficacy 
 
Party position towards 
the constitutional 
status quo 
(instrumented) 
 
.160*** 
 
(.017) 
 
.301*** 
 
(.042) 
 
.166*** 
 
 
(.016) 
 
.293*** 
 
(.038) 
Party identification .027 (.024) .174** (.059) - - 
Left-right self-
placement 
.019*** (.002) .021*** (.006) .018*** (.003) .008 (.008) 
Individual left-right 
extremism 
-.011** (.004) .037*** (.010) -.003 (.005) .070*** (.013) 
Economic evaluations .147*** (.008) .356*** (.019) .125*** (.010) .334*** (.025) 
Male .024* (.010) .014 (.025) .039** (.013) .035 (.034) 
Age -.005** (.002) -.026*** (.005) -.003 (.003) -.022*** (.007) 
Age squared .000** (.000) .000*** (.000) .000 (.000) .000** (.000) 
Education .011*** (.003) .099*** (.008) .008 (.004) .098*** (.011) 
Unemployed -.097*** (.028) -.017 (.071) -.017 (.040) .063 (.102) 
Married .012 (.012) -.001 (.030) .022 (.016) .019 (.041) 
Income .036*** (.004) .067*** (.011) .024*** (.006) .057*** (.015) 
Party in government  .106*** (.018) .269*** (.044) .094*** (.018) .254*** (.045) 
Party legislative size -.001 (.001) .001 (.002) -.000 (.001) .002 (.002) 
Party left-right 
extremism 
.000 (.001) .006** (.002) .000 (.001) .006** (.002) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant  1.392*** (.052) 2.608*** (.132) 1.445*** (.073) 2.633*** (.186) 
Number of 
observations 
21,078 20,885 11,530 11,437 
Underidentification 
test (Kleibergen-Paap 
rk LM statistic) 
519.4*** 514.2*** 614.7*** 609.0*** 
Hansen J-statistic .145 2.543 .059 2.271 
X2 (1) p-value .703 .111 .808 .132 
Note: The results are 2SLS second-stage coefficient estimates (using Stata’s ivreg2 command) and their 
robust standard errors (in parentheses): *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. Party position towards the 
constitutional status quo is instrumented using party office orientation and party seat-vote 
disproportionality.  
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Figure1. Party Support for Constitutional Status Quo and  
Party Goals in 15 Established Democracies. 
 
Figure 2. Political System Support among Nonpartisans and Partisans of Parties  
with High, Medium, and Low Support for the Constitutional Status Quo 
 in 15 Established Democracies. 
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Figure 3a. The Effects of Party Positions towards Constitutional Status Quo on 
Partisans’ Satisfaction with Democracy in 15 Democracies, 1996-2002.  
 
Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals 
 
Figure 3b. The Effects of Party Positions towards Constitutional Status Quo on 
Partisans’ External Efficacy in 15 Democracies, 1996-2002.  
 
Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals 
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